Renegotiating Pariah State Partnerships: Why Myanmar and North Korea Respond Differently to Chinese Influence

Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People, Beijing, China, May 16, 2017. (EPA)

Leif-Eric Easley and I recently published an article in Contemporary Security Policy, titled “Renegotiating Pariah State Partnerships: Why Myanmar and North Korea Respond Differently to Chinese Influence.”

Pariah status for violating international norms over decades increased Myanmar
and North Korea’s dependence on China. Myanmar’s post-2010 reforms sought
to reduce international sanctions and diversify diplomatic relations. North
Korea pursued a diplomatic offensive after the 2018 Winter Olympics, but
only after declaring itself a nuclear state. Why, despite both states’ politically
unsustainable dependence on China, did Myanmar and North Korea pursue
different strategies for renegotiating reliance? Unlike the Kim regime,
Myanmar’s junta could step back from power while protecting its interests.
Pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi was a credible signaler of reforms,
providing Western governments political cover to reduce sanctions. Myanmar
used liberalizing reforms to address internal threats, whereas North Korea
utilizes external threats for regime legitimacy. The theoretical underpinnings
and empirical trajectories of these distinctions–as well as Myanmar’s
backsliding on human rights–explain why reducing reliance on China may
prove more difficult than shedding pariah status.